Appendix. [From Antonius Andreas, one of Scotus’ most faithful students]. Twelfth Distinction

First Question. Whether there is in generable and corruptible things any positive substantial entity really distinct from the form

Scotus, Sent. 2 d.12 q.1
Richard of St. Victor Quodlibet 4 q.5 a.1

1. As to the twelfth distinction the question is first raised whether there is in generable and corruptible things any positive substantial entity really distinct from the form

2. That there is not: Metaphysics 7 text 8, matter is not a what nor a what-sort-of and so on with the other categories; therefore it is nothing. You will say it is being in potency. But to the contrary: matter is not in potency, for matter does not come from matter; nor is matter form, nor is it the composite; therefore, by elimination, it is nothing.

3. Again Physics 5 text 8: What is changed exists, what is generated does not exist. Hereby Aristotle means to distinguish between the subject of generation and that of other changes. So in the same way he removes from the subject of generation that which is matter, just as he attributes what is matter to the subject of change; but what changes is being in potency in the sense of potency in Physics 3 text 6; therefore being in potency is taken away from matter, and so, by elimination, matter is a pure nothing.

4. Again if matter were a per se being it would, according to the Philosopher, be per se knowable; but matter is not knowable save by analogy with form, Physics 1 text 69

5. Again if matter were a per se being it would be an act, and then the composite would not be per se one.

6. To the contrary is Aristotle Physics 2 text 28, that matter is what, present in a thing, a thing is made of. From the phrase ‘made of’ it is plain that matter is not form; from the added phrase ‘present in a thing’ it is plain that matter is not privation.

To the Question

7. I reply by saying that in a generable and corruptible thing there is only one positive reality, which some of them [Richard of Middleton, Albert the Great] call matter and some form, differing only in the term used. The reason is that just as an unlimited quantity is limited by an intrinsic and not extrinsic term that really differs from it, so matter without form is unlimited and is limited by a form as by a term intrinsic to it and not really different from it. And this same entity, considered as unlimited, is called the matter; considered as term it is called the form; considered as a whole, that is as terminated, it is called the composite, and yet it is really one and the same whole. There is a confirmation from the Philosopher On Generation 1 text 10, 23, where he distinguishes generation from alteration and says that generation is the making of the whole and corruption is the destruction of the whole, and that when one thing is generated from another the whole of the one is converted into the whole of the other, but not so in the case of alteration. So there is not anything common that remains the same in the thing generated and the thing corrupted, for then what has just been said would not be true, as is plain.

8. On the contrary: This position is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher when he maintains that there are four per se causes, because in this case there would only be two, namely the efficient and final causes. That there would not be the fourth is plain because you do not posit that there is a difference between matter and form; and that there would not be the third is also plain because the same thing is precisely not cause of itself. Hence each of the intrinsic causes in the composition is in some way different from that of which it is the cause; for the composite at any rate states more than form per se states or than matter per se states. And I say this according to the position of the Commentator, who maintained this on the ground that the same thing is precisely not the cause of itself.

9. Again, substance is divided into simple and composite substance, so not every substance is equally simple really, as this position says.

10. Again, it then follows that a natural agent can create. For the principles of a contrary do not increase but diminish the virtue of a natural agent; therefore if fire can generate fire from air, it will be able to do the same much more quickly when it presupposes nothing, because you say that generation is the production of the whole such that nothing common to the corrupted thing remains in the generated thing. For the presence of air does not strengthen but rather weakens the power of fire, since air has a certain repugnance to fire.

11. I say     therefore that matter is a certain positive entity in the composite.

12. I prove this as follows: a per se principle of nature, a per se cause, a per se foundation of forms, a per se subject of generation, a per se part of a composite, is some per se positive thing; but matter is of this sort; therefore etc     . The major is plain because principle depends on principle, and effect on per se cause, and foundation on foundation, and thing generated on subject of generation, and whole on part; but it is impossible that some true being should depend really on a non-being. Proof of the minor: for matter is a per se principle of nature, is thereby also a per se cause (Physics 2 text 7), is a per se foundation of forms (Metaphysics 5 text 2), and is a per se subject of generation, and a per se part of the composite (Metaphysics 7 text 28). I say, therefore, that matter is some positive being in act and not only in subjective potency, as the other opinion maintains; indeed it is an objective potency, and although it is called potency with respect to the form or the composite, it is yet in itself some act (though rather imperfectly), as is plain, because whatever is outside its efficient cause is some act.

13. To the reason for the opinion [n.7], therefore, I say that form is not an intrinsic degree of matter, because if it was then, since matter has the same nature in all generable and corruptible things, the result would be that all generable and corruptible things would belong to the same species, which is absurd; nor even is it necessary that quantity be always limited by an intrinsic grade, but on the contrary there is an extrinsic limit, as point is in the case of line and line in the case of surface and so on.

14. To the authority from the Philosopher [n.7], which for them is merely verbal, I say that generation terminates per se at the composite not only simply but also in a certain respect. The philosopher states one of these because whiteness is not produced but only a white thing is; but because it is produced from matter and form it is per se one; from accident and subject, however, something one per accidens comes to be; and consequently the former is a true whole and the latter a whole in a certain respect. For this reason is generation said to be the making of a whole.

To the Arguments

15. To the first main argument [n.2] I say that because act and form are what distinguish, and because matter does not have form of itself as an intrinsic term,     therefore does the Philosopher say that matter is not a what nor a what-sort-of etc     ; and this is distinctly and per se true.

16. To the second [n.3] the reply is that the statement ‘what is changed exists’ holds to this extent, that though what is proximate to motion is a potential entity (as the Philosopher says), yet it is necessarily so connected to an entity simply that what is changed is necessarily a complete being simply, but what is generated does not immediately have complete being simply but gets being from what is connected to it.

17. To the third [n.4] I say that matter is in itself per se knowable, just as it has per se its proper being and has its proper idea in God; but it is not per se knowable to us because of the weakness of our intellect, which is not able to grasp what has little and imperfect being; and matter is of this sort being, according to Augustine Confessions 12.32, properly nothing.

18. To the fourth [n.5] I say that matter is not act as act means what forms and perfects but as it is the potency that is informed and perfected; but it is act in the way that act is a difference of being, because it falls under the member of the division that is act. For matter is not merely objective matter, for in this way whatever is outside its cause and is posited in fact is act; and then from such act, and from the act simply that form is, it is indeed a one per se; and this is necessary, otherwise every substance is substance simply, or is a composite of being and nothing etc.

Second Question. Whether matter can, by any power, exist without form

Bonaventure, Sent. 2 d.12 q.1 a.1
Scotus, Sent. 2 d.12 q.2
Thomas, ST Ia q.66 a.1
Richard of St. Victor, Sent. 2 d.12 q.4
Francis of Meyronne, Sent. 2 d.12 q.2
Durandus, Sent. 2 d.12 q.2
John Bacconitanus, Sent.2 d.12 q.un.

1. The question, secondly, is whether matter can, by any power, exist without form.

2. That it cannot, from being and nothing: things that are more the same are less separable; but matter and form are more the same than property and subject. The proof is that the latter make a single thing in the second mode [sc. of per se predication], and yet a property cannot be without a subject (as the having of three angles cannot be without triangle).

3. Further there would be logical implication, which I prove as follows: All existence states act; but every act is form. Further all existence is either act or participant in act; but matter is not act because, in its proper idea, it is being in potency; therefore it is participant in act. But act participated by matter can only be form.

4. Again secondly as follows: Everything that can exist per se has some inferior the same as it, namely something that cannot exist per se;     therefore if matter can be a per se proper accident (which cannot exist per se), there will be something inferior to it, and it will not be nothing but something, which is contrary to Augustine Confessions 12.32.

5. On the contrary: quantity, since it is an accident, is no less dependent naturally posterior to substance than matter to form, since form is substance and naturally prior; but quantity without substance can, by divine power, exist in the sacrament [sc. of the altar]; therefore etc     .

To the Question

6. I reply by saying that, for those who say form is an intrinsic degree of matter, it is no surprise if they say matter cannot exist without form, for the same thing cannot exist without itself; but this position was rejected in the preceding question.

7. Other says that matter is really distinct from form, and they save thereby the reality of composition in generable and corruptible things; and yet they say that matter cannot exist without form. The reason is that everything that exists per se is either act or possesses act;     therefore etc     . The proof of the minor is from the Commentator on the substance of the sphere: ‘Matter,’ he says, ‘exists under possibility.’

8. Again the point is proved by Boethius [On the Trinity 1.3]

9. On the contrary: it was shown above that matter, since it is a real positive entity, exists outside its cause and possesses some act, albeit imperfect act.

10. To the Commentator [n.7] I say, therefore that matter is under subjective but not objective possibility, that is, that matter is by its essence immediately susceptive of forms.

11. To Boethius [n.8] I say that it is true of specific and complete being, and it is true de facto and by nature of every being.

12. I say to the question,     therefore , that on the supposition that matter states some positive entity outside its potency (as is plain from the preceding question), then by divine power it can come to exist per se and be preserved in its proper being without any absolute substantial or accidental form.

13. I prove this in three ways. First as follows: everything absolute naturally prior can exist without any absolute really distinct from it; but matter is such with respect to every absolute form; therefore etc     . The major is plain because there is no contradiction involved in affirming being of what is natural prior and denying it of something naturally posterior that is really different from it. The minor is plain too because matter is an absolute entity, otherwise it would not make an absolute composite; and it is also plain because it is substance (On the Soul 2), and is prior by nature to substantial form because it is the foundation of substantial form; also much more so is it prior to accidental form, and it is really distinct from accidental form (from the preceding question).

14. Again, whatever God can do by means of an extrinsic second cause he can do immediately; but form, although it is intrinsic with respect to the composite, is yet extrinsic with respect to the matter, because it is really distinct from it;     therefore etc     .

15. Again, what is contingent with respect to something can exist without that something; but matter is contingent with respect to every form, because it determines no form for itself;     therefore etc     .

16. If you say that at any rate it cannot exist without a respect to God, I say that this respect is not a superadded form but the same as it, but remote, as is plain from the first distinction of this book 2.

17. If you ask further where it exists, I say that it exists somewhere, but not circumscriptively (for it does not have quantity), but definitively, the way an angel does.

18. If you ask whether it has parts, I say that it would have substantial parts, because it does not get these from quantity.

To the Arguments

19. To the first principal argument [nn.2-3] I say that, when speaking of identity between them [sc. matter and form], the major is true and the minor false. For things that are not the same are not more the same but really distinct. When speaking, however, of identity in third resultant [sc. matter and form when combined produce a third, namely the substantial material thing], the minor is true but the major is false. The thing is plain because form is even naturally corrupted when the matter remains the same, albeit under a different form; but the subject does not remain the same when the proper feature is corrupted.

20. As to the second [n.4] I concede that every accident is inferior in entity to the entity of matter, since matter is true substance.

21. To Augustine [n.4] I say that he is speaking about things that are in the genus of substance;     therefore etc     .